PLEBLINEfree software for bitcoin cold storage
Paper

PlebLine — the idea and the program

October 2026 · by Ale-TheOrangeWay

PlebLine is for people who hold their own bitcoin. It sits between two families of tools, where today there is no tool designed for cold custody:

  • “complex” custody tools: multisig, multivendor setups and the like;
  • “consumer” custody tools: with real vulnerabilities that can cost dearly.

The problem

A cold storage that depends on a multisig is much harder to pass on, and hard to maintain. Being multivendor, you depend on at least three different vendors (for example in a 3-of-5 multisig):

  • three hardware devices from different makers, each with its own vulnerabilities, as recent months have shown;
  • three software houses, which can expose you to software vulnerabilities: firmware updates, computer updates and so on.

The average user has no deep IT skills: that is why PlebLine is a guided flow of actions.

Most users stack bitcoin and rarely use it. For them there is no reason to keep the cold storage always at hand: it would be like carrying your safe when you go out for a drink, or even keeping it at home. And the more you use hardware and software, the more you are at risk, however good they are.

Those who spend often, instead, need a smooth path from cold wallet to hot wallet, because they usually spend on Lightning.

Premise: where the words are kept

PlebLine is designed for a setup in which the seed words, 12 or 24, stay away from the internet and safe 99% of the time. For example engraved on a Cryptosteel or similar, sealed in a steel tube that resists fire and water, and walled up at grandma’s, at relatives’ or friends’, or kept in a bank safe deposit box: wherever you prefer.

What matters is that they are not at your home, and not in an electronic device.

How PlebLine works

The program does not hold your keys and does not replace your wallet. It does the steps you would do by hand, in the same order and the same way every time, so the result does not depend on how attentive you are that evening. They are a few simple steps, which organise the flow between cold and hot wallet for most of the following year, without reopening the cold wallet when there is no need.

On Tails

It is used in one sitting, on Tails: a system that boots from a USB stick, runs in memory and remembers nothing when it shuts down. The network goes out only through Tor.

  1. The words. You type them, every time. They stay only in memory and never touch the disk.
  2. The coins. The program reads them from the chain, through Tor, and takes you to your wallet’s dashboard: how much you have, and in which coins.
  3. What to do. From PlebLine you choose the operation. Every step that cannot be undone asks for confirmation, and the ready answer is no.
  4. Signing, offline. Before signing you unplug the network. The program signs, and checks the result from its bytes before saving it.
  5. Closing. The words leave memory before the network comes back. Signed files are deleted only if you say yes.

When you later broadcast a signed transaction, the program guides you there too.

Refills

From the dashboard, when you want to spend, you reach the refills.

A refill, in PlebLine, is a presigned transaction to a hot wallet: yours, your mother’s, a friend’s, a relative’s. It is literally like a phone top-up.

It is one of PlebLine’s steps, but it is optional and can be skipped. In that step the program has you presign the number of transactions you choose, and shows you the matching QR codes, one per PSBT or hex.

How many is up to you. Someone who spends often has to top up their hot wallet more frequently: they will presign more transactions and broadcast them a little at a time through the year. Someone who spends little will presign few, or none.

The refill concept has two positive consequences and one negative:

  • Positive: a lost QR is not a danger. Whoever finds it can at most broadcast the transaction or delete the file: in neither case is any bitcoin at risk.
  • Positive: you can top up anyone. Not only your own wallet: grandma, a friend, relatives.
  • Negative: tracking. Someone might wrongly assume that every payment is a refill, and so link sender and recipient: with bitcoin chain tracking, that can be harmful. But a refill can go to anyone, so it does not necessarily tell who is on the other side.

What a ceremony looks like

The cold storage opens once; the refills go out in the months afterOne sitting, on TailsIn the months afterThe wordsYou type them; they stay only in memory, never on diskThe coinsRead from the chain through TorThe addressesThey arrive from the phone; you check them with QRsYou unplug the networkFrom here on nothing leaves the computerSign and re-checkOne coin per refill, verified from their bytesThe refills leaveOne QR per refill on the phone, or a USB stick;then the words leave memoryYou send a refillwhen you need it, in any order,from any computerAll arrived?The program says so and askswhether to delete: no is readyThe next groupA new sitting, from the start
the ceremony · one sitting, then the months after

The keys are needed only in the sitting, and signing happens with the network unplugged. Everything else, in the months after, is done without opening the cold storage.

The principles

Every choice in the program follows from a few ideas. They are written here so that whoever uses it, or checks it, can judge them.

  • Your keys stay yours. The program holds nothing and does not generate the words: whoever does not have them yet makes them with dice or cards, and the program explains how. The words never reach the disk and are asked for every time.
  • Don’t trust, verify. Every signed refill can be checked from its bytes, without keys and without network, on any computer. The package itself can be rebuilt and compared byte for byte.
  • One coin, one refill. It is the easiest mistake to make by hand, so it is not left to attention: the program enforces it, with several barriers one behind the other, across ceremonies too.
  • A machine that forgets. The ceremony runs on Tails: it boots from a USB stick, writes nothing to the computer and remembers nothing at the end. The network goes out only through Tor, and signing happens offline.
  • The program informs, the person decides. Every step that cannot be undone asks for confirmation, and the ready answer is no. Signed files are never deleted on their own: even when the server says everything has arrived, it asks.
  • Made for plebs. The intended user holds their own coins but does not write code. For them there is one path, in the terminal or in a window, in their language, and every message says what to do next.
  • Open. The code is free (MIT licence) and written to be read by others: the rules that must not be broken, and the reason for each choice, are documented.

What it protects against, and what it does not

A custody tool is worth as much as its stated limits. These are its limits.

What it defends you from

  • The same coin in two refills of one session. It is blocked in several places, and commitments are read from the signed files themselves: no separate register that could drift out of sync.
  • A refill different from the one you see. The signature covers the whole transaction, amounts are bound to the real transactions the coins come from, and verification redoes the arithmetic from the bytes.
  • Words left lying around. They never touch the disk, signing happens offline, and the machine forgets everything at shutdown.
  • Traffic in the clear. The network goes out only through Tor or to a node of your own; a public server reached in the clear is refused before the first packet leaves.
  • Damaged or tampered files. Every file the ceremony reads back is checked, and an impossible number stops everything instead of passing as good.
  • A fake package. The installer checks every file’s fingerprint and the signature of whoever built it, and asks you to compare that fingerprint with one obtained another way.

What it does not defend you from

  • A server that lies. Coins and confirmations come from one server at a time. It can hide coins or lie about the state of your refills; the decisions that cannot be undone, however, stay with you.
  • Bearer refills. Whoever takes the phone or the stick with the refills can broadcast them all at once, to the recipients chosen at signing.
  • Refills from earlier sessions. Every opening starts from zero and does not look at them. If an old one has not gone out yet and you sign a new one on the same coin, the one sent first counts and the other is refused forever. The program reminds you before signing.
  • The phone as the source of addresses. If the phone is compromised, it can supply wrong addresses, and the check done on the same phone passes.
  • The frozen fee. It is set at signing; if months later it is not enough, raising it means reopening the cold storage.
  • Words typed on a computer. It is the price of not using a separate signing device; the defence is the machine that forgets.

Under the hood

For those who want to check it: how it is built, and where to look in the code. It is written in Rust.

  • Four crates, three programs. plebline-core holds the file formats, coin selection, planning, signing, verification and the split: no user interface, no network (CI enforces it) and #![forbid(unsafe_code)].plebline has the ceremony steps and the expert program,plebline-guided the guided path in the terminal, plebline-gui the same path in a window, calling the same code. The network, mainnet or signet, is chosen at compile time, not with an option.
  • What gets signed. A single-signature BIP84 wallet (P2WPKH), built with BDK and rust-bitcoin. Every signature is SIGHASH_ALL, nLockTime is always 0, and the transactions signal RBF. Each coin’s amount is bound to the transaction it comes from, whose txid is recomputed: a server cannot state a false amount.
  • One coin per refill, in code. DisjointCoinSelection is the coin-selection algorithm handed to BDK, and it never sees a committed coin. The same coins go to unspendable; after building, the real inputs are recorded;check_disjoint checks the whole group. Commitments are read from the signed files, filtered by wallet (descriptor_checksum): no separate register. The guided path starts from zero at every opening: it moves the files of earlier sessions toprecedenti/ and no longer reads them.
  • Verification. verify redoes the arithmetic from the transactions’ bytes, without keys and without network: signatures, fees, size, expected inputs, and that every output goes to an intended recipient or back to the wallet. It runs before any signed group is saved and, in the guided path, before every send. Known limit: the recipient is matched against the address written in the file, not the script in the bytes.
  • The network. A SOCKS5 client inside the program, towards Tor with names resolved inside Tor (socks5h), or towards a node of the user’s own. A public server reached in the clear is refused before the first packet, and a test requires every network call to go through that check. The network code lives in one file,chain.rs.
  • The package. Pinned tools (Rust 1.94.1, zig, cargo-zigbuild),--locked, and the machine’s paths rewritten: the same commit, built on the same machine, gives the same bytes. The Tails installer checks every file’s fingerprint and the package’s GPG signature, and asks you to compare the key’s fingerprint with one obtained another way.
  • Tests. 430 automated tests, including the full guided ceremony with scripted answers, hostile files, a fake chain and QR codes read back by a decoder.

In the repository, for reviewers: SECURITY.md (what it protects against and what it does not), docs/ARCHITECTURE.md, docs/DECISIONS.md (the choices and their reasons) and docs/REVIEWING.md (where to start, and the open findings).

Who it is for, and where it stands

PlebLine is for people who hold a single-signature cold storage, 12 to 24 BIP39 words with or without a passphrase, and want to open it as rarely as possible. It does not handle multisig, signing devices, Lightning or complex descriptors.

Today it is at version 0.1, with 430 automated tests. The full ceremony has been carried out on signet, including on a real Tails. An internal security review fixed the most serious defects and listed the open ones; there is no third-party review yet.